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The Injured Public Employee: Accidential Injuries in the Public Sector
Workplace
by Arnold G. Rubin
I. Introduction
Police officers and firefighters are,
perhaps, the most obvious examples of
public employees who may sustain
accidental injuries in the performance
of their work-related duties. Benefits
are available for these public employees under the Illinois Workers’
Compensation Act, provided that the
city for whom the employee works has
a population of less than 200,000.1 City
of Chicago police officers and
firefighters are excluded from this
analysis.2
The Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act generally provides benefits for
an injured worker in three specific
areas:
1. Medical treatment, including all
aspects of physical rehabilitation,
and vocational rehabilitation;3
2.Payment of temporary total
disability benefits;4
3. Payment for the permanent
disability sustained by the worker.
(Recent amendments to the Act
have expanded these benefits).5
An injured public employee may
also be entitled to benefits available
under the applicable Pension Code,6
the Public Employee Disability Act,7
or the Public Safety Employee Benefits
Act.8 A determination as to whether
these “other” benefits may be available
should be considered by the public
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employee, his or her attorney, and the
employer in connection with the
workers’ compensation claim. The
failure to take into consideration these
potentially valuable benefits made
specifically available to public employees could have a detrimental economic
effect upon the worker.
This article will contrast the
benefits available to private sector
employees and public sector employees
who sustain work-related injuries,
using the three general categories of
benefits described above (medical,
temporary total disability, and permanency). Under each category, the
additional, or alternative, benefits
that may be available to the public
employee will be analyzed. The public
employee’s economic security will not
be safeguarded unless due consideration is given to all available benefits
following a work-related injury, not
just those available under the Illinois
Workers’ Compensation Act.

II. Medical Benefits
When public employees sustain workrelated injuries, they are entitled,
generally, to payment for medical care
under the provisions of the Illinois
Workers’ Compensation Act, just as
an employee working in the private
sector. There is no distinction between
the public sector and private sector in
this analysis. The benefits afforded to
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injured workers under the Illinois
Workers’ Compensation Act are
covered under Sections 8(a)9 and 8.2.10
Section 8.2 represents significant
changes to the Workers’ Compensation Act, which took effect on February
1, 2006.
Section 8(a) of the Illinois
Workers’ Compensation Act provides
that the employer must pay for all
“necessary medical expenses.”11 The
medical expenses include necessary
first aid, medical, surgical and
hospital services that are reasonably
required to cure or relieve the injured
employee from the effects of the
accidental injury. Payment for medical expenses under the Illinois
Workers’ Compensation Act also
includes payment for physical, mental
and vocational rehabilitation.12
There are certain limitations with
respect to the medical care covered
under Section 8(a). Unquestionably,
all first aid and emergency treatment
must be paid for by the employer. In
addition to first aid and emergency
treatment, the employer must pay for
all medical services provided by the
physician, surgeon or hospital initially chosen by the employee, or by
any other physician, consultant,
expert or other provider of services
recommended by the initial service
provider, or any subsequent provider
of medical services in the chain of
referrals from the initial provider. In
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addition, the employer is responsible
for payment for all medical services for
any treatment provided by a second
provider of medical services in a chain
of referrals from the second service
provider.13
Significant changes were recently
made to the Workers’ Compensation
Act. Specifically, Section 8.2 now
provides for a medical fee schedule as it
relates to payment for medical
services. Under this change to the
Act, for treatment rendered on and
after February 1, 2006, the maximum
allowable payment shall be 90 percent
of the 80th percentile of charges and
fees as determined by the Workers’
Compensation Commission, utilizing
various sources of information provided by employers’ and insurers’
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national databases. This change also
applies, implicitly, to accidents occurring before February 1, 2006.14
Further, section 8.2(e) now prohibits balance billing. Balance billing
is the well-known practice of medical
providers sending bills and threatening collection actions against employees for unpaid balances for medical
treatment in connection with workrelated injuries. Section 8.2(e) now
prohibits a provider from billing or
otherwise attempting to recover from
the employee the difference between
the provider’s charge and the amount
paid by the employer or the insurer on
a compensable injury.15
Generally speaking, the employee
working in either the public or private
sector must closely safeguard his or
her medical rights, in connection with
a pending workers’ compensation
claim. Unless provisions are made in
the settlement contract for future
medical rights, or unless the case has
proceeded to hearing in order to keep
open the employee’s medical rights
under Section 8(a) of the Act, the
employee may not be entitled to
payment for medical services for
treatment for the work-related injuries upon settlement of the case.16
Therefore, an employee must take into
consideration the necessity of future
medical rights, when making a final
decision relating to settlement of a
workers’ compensation claim. If the
case is settled, and the worker still
requires treatment, the group medical
insurance policy will not necessarily
provide coverage.

III. Temporary Total
Disability
A worker who sustains an injury at
work and becomes unable to perform
his or her job duties may be determined to be temporarily totally
disabled from work. Normally, the
worker is under active medical
treatment for the injuries suffered at

2

work and has not been released to
return to work activities. The injured
employee is entitled to payment of
weekly compensation benefits. There
is a difference between benefits
available to the private sector
employee and the public sector
employee during the first year that the
employee is disabled.
A. Temporary Total Disability
Benefits for the Injured Private
Sector Worker
Compensation for temporary total
disability is one type of interim benefit
available to injured workers under the
provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act.17 “Temporary total disability” has been defined as “[t]he period
immediately after the accident during
which the injured employee is totally
incapacitated for work by reason of the
illness attending the injury. It might
be described as the period of the
healing process.”18 Another definition
of temporary total disability, or
incapacity, is the period of time that a
worker is not able to work. A worker is
“physically able to work when he can
do so without endangering his life or
health.”19 In a recent decision, the
Illinois Appellate Court focused the
analysis of temporary total disability,
stating that “the dispositive question
is whether the employee’s condition
had stabilized.”20 The court further
stated that, “the duration of temporary
total disability is not defined by
whether an employee can find a job
somewhere else.”21
An injured worker who is
determined to be temporarily totally
disabled is entitled to be paid
temporary total disability benefits
pursuant to Section 8(b) of the Illinois
Workers’ Compensation Act.22 Section
8(b) was recently amended to increase
the minimum amount of temporary
total disability benefits provided to an
injured worker. Section 8(b) also
provides that the compensation rate
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for temporary total incapacity shall be
equal to 66 2/3 percent of the employee’s
average weekly wage computed in
accordance with Section 10 of the Act.23
The minimum benefit now available is not less than 66 2/3 percent of
the federal minimum wage under the
Fair Labor Standards Act or the
Illinois minimum wage under the
minimum wage law, whichever is
more, multiplied by 40 hours.24 There
are certain maximum benefits available to injured workers.25 The current
maximum benefits for injuries occurring between July 15, 2006, and
January 14, 2007 is $1,120.87.26
B. Temporary Total Disability
Benefits for Public Employees
(PEDA)
For the public sector employee, there
is a special statutory scheme that
provides for payment of benefits for up
to one year following a work-related
injury. The Public Employee Disability Act (PEDA)27 provides for disability
benefits for “an eligible employee,”
which includes full-time law enforcement officers or full-time firefighters.
PEDA provides that, if the eligible
employee suffers an injury in the line
of duty causing that employee to be
unable to perform his or her duties, the
employing public entity shall continue
to pay the employee on the same basis
as before the injury, with no deduction
from sick leave, vacation, or other
service credits. Payment is limited to
“one year” for the same injury.28 Thus,
the public employee is, essentially,
entitled to salary continuation for up
to one year after the injury. If the
worker remains disabled from returning to work after one year, it is quite
clear that the injured worker would
then be entitled to receive temporary
total disability benefits.29
In the recent case of Albee v. City
of Bloomington,30 the Illinois Appellate Court interpreted Section 1(b) of
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the PEDA as not requiring that the
one-year period of incapacity be
continuous. The court explained that
“it is certainly possible that a person
can be incapacitated for a period of
time, return to work, and then be incapacitated for a subsequent period.” 31
The court reasoned that it would be
contrary to the purposes of the Public
Employees Disability Act if an officer
were penalized for making a good faith
effort to return to work.
IV. Permanency Benefits
This section of the article will analyze
the permanency benefits available to
public sector and private sector
employees. Employees must carefully
analyze the type of applicable
permanency benefits when it becomes
likely that they will not be able to
return to their previous employment,
or in other words, when the injury
becomes “career-ending.”
A. Benefits Available to Injured
Workers in the Private Sector
under the Illinois Workers’
Compensation Act
An injured worker is entitled to
permanent disability payments for
either permanent partial disability or
permanent total disability under the
Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act.
These benefits are described below:
1. Specific Losses
Section 8(e) of the Workers’
Compensation Act provides what may
be referred to as scheduled or specific
losses.32 For example, an employee
who sustains an injury to a hand, after
February 1, 2006, is entitled to 205
weeks of compensation at the
appropriate permanent partial disability rate.33 The total value of the hand
or any other body part listed under the
schedule assumes 100 percent disability. If the resulting injury causes a 50
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percent loss of the body part, then 50
percent of the total amount of weeks
would be awarded at the appropriate
permanent partial disability rate.34
2. Disfigurement
In addition to specific loss recoveries, injured workers are entitled to
compensation for serious disfigurement under Section 8(c) of the Act. To
be entitled to compensation under this
section of the Act, there must be
serious and permanent disfigurement
to the hand, head, face, neck, arm, leg
below the knee, or chest above the
axillary line. Prior to July 20, 2005,
the maximum amount of disfigurement benefit available to an injured
worker was 150 weeks. As a result of
the amendments, for the periods from
July 20, 2005 through November 15,
2005, or after February 1, 2006,
disfigurement may be awarded up to
162 weeks.35
3. “Person as a Whole” and Wage Loss
Claims
Another form of recovery is provided
for in paragraph 8(d) of the Workers’
Compensation Act.36 Section 8(d)(1)37
is normally referred to as the “wage
loss” section of the Act. If an employee
has established that he or she is
permanently impaired from returning
to the employee’s usual and customary occupation, and has sustained a reduced earning capacity as a result of
the work-related injuries, then compensation may be awarded based on
66 2/3 percent of the difference between
the average amount the employee
earned or would be able to currently
earn in his or her usual and customary
occupation before the accident and the
average amount the employee is
earning or is able to earn in some
suitable employment after the accident. Amendments to the Workers’
Compensation Act have increased the
maximum amount awarded under
Section 8(d)(1).38 The award under
Section 8(d)(1) results in payment of
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weekly benefits for the “duration of the
disability.”39 However, the amendment of Section 8(d)(1) has also been
modified so as to provide employers
more rights to review awards.40
Section 8(d) of the Act also provides
compensation under Section 8(d)(2)
which has been referred to as loss of
use to the person as a whole.41
Normally, injuries involving the head,
neck or back are covered under Section
8(d)(2). Fractured vertebrae, skull
fractures, facial fractures, injuries to
kidneys, spleen or lung, are also
provided specific coverage under
Section 8(d)(2). The “person” is valued
at 500 weeks. Percentages of disability
are computed based on the value of 500
weeks. Thus 10 percent loss under
Section 8(d)(2) amounts to fifty weeks
at the applicable permanency rate.42
This section of the Act also covers
injuries that may disable the employee
from pursuing other suitable occupations, or which have otherwise
resulted in physical impairment. In
addition, this section covers injuries
which partially incapacitate the
worker from pursuing the duties of his
or her usual and customary line of
employment, but do not result in an
impairment of earning capacity.43
Even if the employee has sustained a
wage loss, the employee may elect
coverage under 8(d)(2) if the employee
waives recovery under Section 8(d)(1).44
This is a particularly important
consideration for public employees.45
4. Permanent Total Disability
Finally, the Workers’ Compensation Act provides for permanent total
disability benefits. A specific permanent total disability award is provided
under Section 8(e)(18)46 of the Act,
which specifically sets forth that, in
the case of the complete loss of use of
both hands, arms, feet, legs, or any
two of them, the injured worker is
considered totally disabled from work.
The worker is entitled to payment of
benefits equivalent to 66 2/3 percent of
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the employee’s average weekly wage.47
Section 8(f)48 also provides for payment
of permanent total disability benefits
when it is determined that a person is
wholly and permanently incapable of
work.49
If a worker is awarded permanent
total disability, the benefits are to
continue for as long as the employee
remains permanently totally disabled
from work.50 In addition, once it is
determined by the Workers’ Compensation Commission that the employee
is entitled to permanent total
disability benefits, the employee also
becomes entitled to receive an increase
in benefits pursuant to the Rate
Adjustment Fund provided for under
the Act. The Rate Adjustment Fund
provides for payments to be made on
July 15th of the second year next
following the date of entry of the
award. The Rate Adjustment Fund
does not apply where there has been a
lump sum settlement of the workers’
compensation claim.51
5. Summary of Permanency Benefits
When work-related injuries are
sustained by the employee working in
the private sector, the main concern
for the worker is to obtain the best type
of recovery available under one of the
categories set forth above. For
instance, depending on the circumstances, an injury to a specific part of
the body might be better compensated
for under Section 8(d)(1) of the Act or
Section 8(d)(2) of the Act. If, however,
an injured worker sustains a loss of
earning capacity, but the loss of
earnings is minimal, the worker may
obtain a better recovery under the
specific loss sections of the Act, or
under loss of use to the person as a
whole.
Special consideration, as to the
choice of theory, must be given if the
injury is sustained to an employee
such as a police officer or firefighter
working in the public sector. This
consideration is mandated when the
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injury is “career-ending.” Otherwise,
the public employee may sustain
economic harm.
B. Benefits Available to the
Injured Worker in the Public
Sector
A police officer or firefighter is entitled
to the same type of permanency
benefits under the Act as an injured
private sector employee.52 When the
work-related injuries do not result in
permanent restrictions or total disability preventing the police or
firefighters from continuing in their
occupations, then the decision as to
how to choose the best recovery of
benefits is similar to that set forth
above relating to recovery for a specific
loss, disfigurement, or loss of use
under Section 8(d)(2) of the Act.
However, the analysis completely
changes when work restrictions or
total disability prevents police officers
or firefighters from continuing in their
occupations. This is where an analysis
of benefits available to the public
sector employee must include a review
of those benefits available under the
applicable Pension Code.
1. Duty Disability Pension
For the public employee, special
consideration must be given to benefits
available under the applicable Pension Code. The Illinois Pension Code
applicable for police officers injured in
the line of duty entitles the officer to a
disability retirement pension equal to
65 percent of the salary attached to the
rank on the police force held by the
officer at the date of suspension of duty
or retirement.53 The police officer is
considered to be on duty while on any
assignment approved by the chief of
the police department of the municipality he or she serves whether the
assignment is within or outside of the
municipality.54 The police officer must
prove that he or she is physically or
mentally disabled from service in the
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police department.55
Similarly, firefighters are entitled
to disability pension benefits. If the
firefighter is found to be physically or
mentally disabled from service in the
fire department, the firefighter shall
be entitled to a disability pension equal
to 65 percent of the monthly salary
attached to the rank held by him or her
in the fire department at the date he or
she is removed from the department
payroll.56 The firefighter will receive
this benefit for as long as he or she or
his or her survivors live.57
a. The Medical Evidence Requirement
The duty disability pension must be
applied for once it is determined that
the employee will not be able to return
to work in his or her occupation as a
police officer or firefighter. Section 3115 of the Pension Code requires the
employee to obtain certification of the
disability from three practicing physicians selected by the pension board.
The pension board may also require
other evidence of disability.58
The three board-selected physicians certification requirement was
recently analyzed by the Illinois
Appellate Court in Turcol v. Pension
Board of Trustees Matteson Police
Pension Fund.59 A police officer had
filed an application for line of duty
disability pension benefits which was
denied. One of the reasons for the
denial of the application was that only
two of the three physicians elected by
the board certified that the officer was
disabled. The decision of the pension
board was affirmed by the circuit court
that had reviewed the pension board’s
finding.
In Turcol, the injury to the
employee involved his right shoulder.
There was a recommendation for the
police officer to undergo surgery for the
shoulder. The police officer decided not
to proceed with the surgery. The police
officer’s treating physician and two of
the three doctors selected by the
pension board opined that he was
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disabled and unable to return to his job
as a police officer. The third boardselected doctor determined that the
police officer was neither permanently
disabled nor prevented him from
returning to police duties.
An evidence deposition was taken
of the physician who opined that the
police officer was not disabled. The
deposition revealed that the physician
did not have all of the police officer’s
medical records when he evaluated
him. In addition, the physician
revealed a bias in that he had
evaluated six or seven other police
officers as requested by the same law
firm for the pension board, but could
not remember rendering an opinion in
their favor for disability. Further
criticism of the physician included
that his opinions were “conjectural”
and that he “belittled” the opinions of
the police officer’s treating physician.60
The appellate court refused to
reverse the decision of the pension
board denying the police officer duty
disability pension benefits based on
the cross-examination in the evidence
deposition of the examining doctor.
The appellate court would not “reweigh the credibility determination
made by the board.”61 Accordingly, the
appellate court affirmed the decision of
the pension board denying pension
benefits. The appellate court did not
address the issue as to whether the
certification requirements of Section
3-115 were constitutional. 62
b. The “Act of Duty” Requirement
The “act of duty” section of the Pension
Code63 requires that the act of a police
officer involve special risk not
ordinarily assumed by a citizen in the
ordinary walks of life. However, the
act of duty need not be a high-risk
action; an act of duty may include
pedaling a bicycle. In Alm v.
Lincolnshire Police Pension Board,64
the police officer sustained an injury
from riding his bicycle. The appellate
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court determined that the police
officer’s pedaling of the bicycle was an
act of duty because the officer faced
risks not ordinarily encountered by
civilians. Specifically, the court pointed
out that the police officer was required
to ride his bicycle at night over varying
terrain, carried a significant amount
of additional weight and had to look
after his personal safety while
performing the patrol duties. The
court further explained that the police
officer faced the risk of falls, collisions,
and “dangerous encounters with the
unsavory elements of society.”65
c. Reduction of Benefits-Impact of the
Pension Code on Workers’ Compensation Benefits
Assuming that the injured police
officer or firefighter establishes, before
the pension board, entitlement to duty
disability pension benefits, special
consideration must be given to the
effect of the disability pension upon the
workers’ compensation claim. This is
important because of the sections of
the Pension Code that define “reduction of benefits.”
For example, assume that the
police officer or firefighter sustained a
back injury “in the line of duty.”
Assume further that the work-related
injury resulted in herniated discs at
two levels, which required the
employee to undergo a surgical fusion
of the lumbar spine. Thereafter, at the
conclusion of the medical treatment,
the employee is medically deemed
unable to return to work as a police
officer or firefighter. At this point, the
employee must decide what specific
type of recovery to pursue under the
Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act,
when taking into consideration the
possibility that the worker may also be
entitled to disability pension benefits.
The clear answer to this question
is provided for under additional
sections of the Pension Code for police
officers and firefighters. Under each
Pension Code, if the police officer or
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firefighter becomes entitled to a
disability pension, and is also entitled
to benefits under the Workers’
Compensation Act for the same injury,
the duty disability benefit may be
reduced.66 However, the offset provisions further provide that there will be
no reduction for payments made for
scheduled losses for the loss or
permanent and complete or permanent and partial loss of use of any
bodily member or the body taken as a
whole. Thus, it is quite clear that if the
injured police officer or firefighter
decides to first seek recovery for either
a permanent total disability, or wage
loss recovery under Section 8(d)(1) of
the Workers’ Compensation Act, those
benefits will reduce the amount to be
paid to the injured worker under the
respective disability pension. The
failure to properly coordinate these
benefits may have a severe negative
economic impact upon the injured
worker.
Prior to 1997, the Pension Codes
did not provide any exceptions for setoff in connection with recoveries under
the Illinois Workers’ Compensation
Act. In Village of Winnetka v.
Industrial Commission,67 the Illinois
Appellate Court considered the issue
whether a firefighter was barred from
proceeding in his workers’ compensation claim against the Village which
had enacted an ordinance providing for
payment of medical care and hospital
expenses in the case of an accident
resulting in an injury or death. The
appellate court found that the village’s
failure to provide, in the ordinance, for
payment of allowances of money did
not cause the village to lose the
Pension Code bar.
The injured
fireman was precluded from pursuing
a claim under the Illinois Workers’
Compensation Act.68
The Pension Code was amended in
1997 in response to the Village of
Winnetka case. The amendment to
the Pension Code expressly allowed
injured firefighters and police officers
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to pursue workers’ compensation
benefits, even though their employers
had an active ordinance pursuant to
Section 306 of the Pension Code.69
The obvious strategy, then, for the
police officer or firefighter is to pursue
the line of duty disability pension
before deciding to choose a theory of
recovery for permanency benefits
under the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act. If the application for the
disability pension is approved, then
the workers’ compensation claim may
be later resolved by settlement or
hearing, taking into consideration
that benefits should be sought for a
scheduled loss for a bodily member or
for the body taken as a whole under
Section 8(d)(2) of the Workers
Compensation Act. In this way, the
benefits available for the police officer
or fireman will be properly coordinated
under both the Illinois Workers’
Compensation Act and the applicable
Pension Code.
2. Health Insurance Benefits Available to Injured Employees Receiving
Disability Pension
Section 10 of the Public Safety
Employee Benefits Act provides that
health coverage benefits will be made
available for employees who sustain a
catastrophic injury under specific
circumstances.70 The type of employees who are entitled to this benefit
include full-time law enforcement,
correctional probation officers, or
firefighters. For instance, a police
officer would be entitled to continue in
a municipality’s group health insurance policy if awarded a disability
pension. For catastrophic injuries to
the injured police officer where the
disability pension is awarded, the
employer is required to pay the entire
premium of the employer’s health
insurance plan for the injured
employee, the injured employee’s
spouse, and for each dependent child of
the injured employee until that child
reaches the age of majority, or until
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the end of the calendar year in which
the child reaches the age of twentyfive. In addition, increases are
regularly provided for in connection
with the disability pension benefits.
Catastrophic injury under the Public
Safety Employee Benefits Act has been
interpreted by the courts as including
any injury that prevents the employee
from performing his or her job duties,
which would entitle that employee to
the disability pension. This is a
significantly important benefit that
would be available to the injured
employee and his or her family.
All employees who are entitled to
disability pension benefits necessarily
meet the requirement of “catastrophic
injury.” In Krohe v. City of Bloomington,71 the Illinois Supreme Court
found that a “catastrophic injury” is
synonymous with an injury resulting
in a line of duty disability under the
Pension Code. There is no need for
further analysis of definition of a
catastrophic-type injury. The Supreme Court relied upon legislative
history in order to make this
determination.
This particular holding is contrary to that of the earlier appellate
court in the decision of Villareal v.
Village of Schaumburg.72 In that
case, a police officer was operating a
contracting business after his workrelated disability retirement pension
was approved. Under the special facts
of that case, it was determined that he
did not meet the “definition” of
catastrophic injury; therefore, he was
not entitled to payment of lifetime
health insurance benefits.
The benefit provided to the injured
employee under the Public Safety
Employee Benefits Act relates to
health coverage. The Public Safety
Employee Benefits Act does not
specifically state that the health
insurance plan must provide coverage
for a work-related injury. If the worker
decides to pursue settlement of his or
her workers’ compensation claim after
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obtaining a disability pension, consideration must first be given to the
employee’s future medical treatment.
The employee must understand that it
is quite possible that under the
particular employer’s health insurance plan, there may not be any
coverage for treatment for the person’s
work-related injury based upon a “preexisting condition.” This must be
verified since “exclusions” may vary
among different group policies.
If the injured employee is of the
opinion that future medical care will
be required, then a decision needs to be
made as to whether the workers’
compensation case should proceed to
hearing for purpose of obtaining an
award from an arbitrator. In this way,
the injured worker will maintain his
medical rights under Section 8(a) of
the Workers’ Compensation Act.73
The injured worker must distinguish
between the type of coverage available
under the employer’s health insurance
plan and those medical benefits
available under Section 8(a) of the
Workers’ Compensation Act.

V. Conclusion
This article has explored the interrelationship between specific benefits
under Illinois Pension Codes and
PEDA for police officers and fire fighters with benefits under the Illinois
Workers’ Compensation Act. It is quite
clear that in two specific areas, both
the employee and employer must
consider the impact of each applicable
statute. First, PEDA benefits, as
compared to temporary total disability
benefits, are available during the first
year that the worker is disabled from
work. Second, the injured public
employee, in a case involving a careerending injury must choose the
appropriate theory of recovery for the
workers’ compensation claim in light
of the potential off-set/reduction of the
injured employee’s disability pension
benefits. The injured worker may
sustain a significant economic loss if
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the correct theory of recovery is not
pursued at the Workers’ Compensation Commission in light of available
disability pension benefits. It is quite
clear that, when benefits are available
under the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act and may also be available
under the Pension Code, the worker
should pursue benefits under the
Pension Code first, and leave the
workers’ compensation claim pending
at the Illinois Workers’ Compensation
Commission, until there is a final
determination from the pension board.
This should assure the best recovery
X
for the worker.
* Grateful recognition is given to my
partner, Cameron B. Clark, whose research and editing aided in the preparation of this article.
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less); park 40 ILCS 5/12 (employees for
cities with populations over 500,000); 40
ILCS 5/13 (sanitary district employees);
40 ICS 5/17-117.1 (public school teachers
for cities with populations over 500,000).
7. 5 ILCS 345/1.
8. 820 ILCS 320/10.
9. 820 ILCS 305/8(a).
10. 820 ILCS 305/8.2.
11. 820 ILCS 305/8(a).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. 820 ILCS 305/8.2.
15. 820 ILCS 305/8.2(e). (Also applies to
denied claims where the injured employee has informed the medical provider
that claim is on file at the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission); 820 ILCS
305/8.2(e-5).
16. Efengee Elec. Supply Co. v. Indus.
Comm’n, 36 Ill. 2d 450, 223 N.E.2d 135
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(1967). The court stated that “the intent
of section 8(a) is to make the employer’s
liability continuous,” as it relates to payment for medical services. Id. at 453, 223
N.E.2d at 136. As a practical matter, most
settlement contracts require that the
worker waive future section 8(a) rights.
17. Payments begin after a three working day waiting period and continue for
as long as the disability lasts; if the period
of temporary total incapacity continues
for 14 days or more, compensation begins on the day after the accident. 820
ILCS 305/8(b).
18. Mt. Olive Coal Co. v. Indus. Comm’n,
295 Ill. 429, 431, 129 N.E. 103, 104 (1920).
19. W. Cartridge Co. v. Indus. Comm’n,
357 Ill. 29, 33, 191 N.E. 213, 214 (1934).
20. Freeman United Coal Mining Co. v.
Indus. Comm’n, 318 Ill.App.3d 170, 175,
741 N.E.2d 1144,1148 (5th Dist. 2000).
21. Id. at 179, 741 N.E.2d at 151.
22. 820 ILCS 305/8(b).
23. 820 ILCS 305/10. Generally speaking, Section 10 provides that average
weekly wage means the actual earnings
of the employee in the employment in
which he was working during the 52
weeks preceding the date of injury.
24. 820 ILCS 305/8(b)(1).
25. These benefits are increased periodically. 820 ILCS 305/8(b)(4).
26. See id. (showing how to calculate
maximum benefits).
27. 5 ILCS 345/1.
28. 5 ILCS 345/1(b).
29. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
30. 365 Ill.App.3d 526, 849 N.E.2d 1094,
(4th Dist. 2006).
31. Id. at 529, 849 N.E.2d at 1097.
32. 820 ILCS 305/8(e).
33. As a result of recent amendments to
the Act, the amount of compensation for
specific loss, has been increased for accidents after February 1, 2006 and occurring between July 20, 2005 and November 15, 2005. 820 ILCS 305/8(e).
34. 820 ILCS 305/8(b)(2.1). The compensation rate for specific loss is computed
at 60% of the average weekly wage, with
maximum benefits set forth under 820
ILCS 305/8(b)(4).
35. 820 ILCS 305/8(c).
36 .820 ILCS 305/8(d).
37. 820 ILCS 305/8(d)(1).
38. 820 ILCS 305/8(b)(4). The maximum
benefit, for injuries after February 1,
2006, has been increased to 100% of the
state’s average weekly wage.
39. 820 ILCS 305/8(d)(1).
40. 820 ILCS 305/19(h). The time period
under 19(h) for 8(d)(1) awards has been
increased to 60 months.
41. 820 ILCS 305/8(d)(2).
42. The permanency rate for section
8(d)(2) is based on 60% of the employee’s
average weekly wage with a maximum
benefit and minimum benefit set by the
Act. 820 ILCS 305/8(d)(2); 820 ILCS 305/
8(b)(4).
43. 820 ILCS 305/8(d)(2).
44. Id.
45. See text accompanying notes. 65-68
infra.
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46. 820 ILCS 305/8(e)(18).
47. 820 ILCS 305/8(b)(4).
48. 820 ILCS 305/8(f).
49. In addition, an employee may establish a permanent total disability by applying the “odd-lot” theory. See ABBC-E Services v. Indus. Comm’n, 316 Ill.App.3d 745,
737 N.E.2d 682 (5th Dist. 2000).
50. Awards for permanent total may be
reviewed before the Commission to determine if the award should be reduced
or terminated. 820 ILCS 305/8(f).
51. Id.
52. See supra notes 31-50, and accompanying text.
53. 40 ILCS 5/3-114.1.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 40 ILCS 5/4-110.
57. 49 ILCS 5/4-114.
58. 40 ILCS 5/3-115.
59. 359 Ill.App.3d. 795, 834 N.E.2d 490
(1st Dist. 2005).
60. Id. at 799-801, 834 N.E.2d at 495-96.
61. Id. at 801, 834 N.E.2d at 496.
62. Id. at 802, 834 N.E.2d at 497. The three
doctor certification requirement of Section 3-115 of the Pension Code provides,
in part, that a disability pension will not
be paid unless certificates of disability are
filed with the pension board by three practicing physicians selected by the pension
board. The constitutionality of Section 3115 was recently addressed by the Illinois Supreme Court in Marconi v. Chicago Heights Board (Docket # 101418, Illinois Supreme Court, Filed October 19,
2006). In Marconi v. Chicago Heights Police Pension Board, 361 Ill.App.3d 1, 836
N.E.2d 705 (1st Dist. 2005), the appellate
court held that the statutory requirement
of three practicing physicians to provide
certification that a police officer was disabled was unconstitutional as applied to
the application filed by the police officer.
The Marconi case presented a fact situation which allowed the supreme court to
consider the constitutionality of the statute. According to the supreme court in
Turcol, it is proper for a reviewing court
to engage in Section 3-115 analysis only
after deciding that the pension board
erred in its determination that the officer
failed to prove his or her disability. Turcol
v. Pension Bd., 214 Ill.2d 521, 524, 828
N.E.2d 277, 278 (2005). The Marconi case
met the supreme court requirement for
evaluating the constitutionality of the
statute. According to the appellate court
in Marconi, the pension board’s decision
to deny the disability was clearly erroneous. Thus, the decision as to whether the
pension board’s ruling should be affirmed
turns on the constitutionality of Section
3-115. However, the supreme court reversed the appellate court and vacated
that portion of the appellate court’s opinion holding section 3-115 of the Pension
Code unconstitutional. The supreme
court upheld the findings of the pension
board based on the evidence presented
at the pension hearing. As a result, the
supreme court declined to actually address the constitutionality of section 3-
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115.
63. 40 ILCS 5/3-114.1.
64. 352 Ill.App.3d 595, 816 N.E.2d 389 (2d
Dist. 2004).
65. Id. at 601, 816 N.E.2d at 394. See also
Mabie v. Village of Schaumburg, 364
Ill.App.3d 756 847 N.E.2d 796 (1st Dist.
2006.).
66. For police officers, see 40 ILCS 5/3114.5(a); For firefighters, see 40 ILCS 5/
4-114.2.
67. 232 Ill.App.3d 351, 597 N.E.2d 630 (1st
Dist. 1992).
68. Id. at 357, 597 N.E.2d at 634.
69. 40 ILCS 5/22-306.
70. 820 ILCS 320/10. Section B provides
for the specific circumstances which must
be met in order to allow for payment of
the premiums.
71. 204 Ill.2d 392, 789 N.E.2d 1211 (2003).
72. 325 Ill.App.3d 1157, 759 N.E.2d 76 (1st
Dist. 2001).
73. 820 ILCS 320/8(a).
X

Recent
Developments
Recent Developments is a regular
feature of The Illinois Public Employee
Relations Report. It highlights recent
legal developments of interest to the
public employment relations community. This issue focuses on developments under the two collective
bargaining statutes, the First Amendment, and the Family Medical Leave
Act.

IELRA Developments
Discrimination
In Abuzir v. Chicago Board of
Education, Case No. 2004-CA-0061-C
(IELRB 2006), the IELRB held that the
Chicago Board of Education (CBE) did
not commit an unfair labor practice
under IELRA sections 14(a)(1) and
14(a)(3) by suspending a teacher
engaged in union activity. The IELRB
reasoned that the suspension, despite
its suspect timing, was not an unfair
labor practice because it was not
motivated by anti-union animus.
Yusuf Abuzir, a tenured Chicago
elementary school teacher, filed an
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unfair labor practice charge with the
IELRB, claiming he was suspended
three times for receiving assistance
from the Chicago Teachers Union in
disciplinary matters. The CBE responded that Abuzir was suspended for
inappropriate conduct towards supervisors and students. The IELRB
Executive Director dismissed Abuzir’s
unfair labor practice charge.
The IELRB affirmed the dismissal,
relying on its three-part test to
determine whether an employer’s
conduct violated sections 14(a)(1) and
14(a)(3) of the IELRA. The charging
party must prove that: 1) he engaged
in union activities; 2) the employer
was aware of those activities; and 3)
the employer, motivated at least in
part by anti-union animus, took
adverse action against the charging
party to encourage or discourage union
membership or support. Board of
Education, City of Peoria School
District No. 150 v. IELRB, 318 Ill.
App. 3d. 144, 741 N.E.2d 690 (4th Dist.
2000). Factors demonstrating antiunion animus include expressions of
hostility toward unionization, timing,
targeting of union supporters, inconsistencies between the employer’s
reason for the adverse action and
reason for other actions, and shifting
explanations for the adverse action.
City of Burbank v. ISLRB, 128 Ill. 2d.
335, 538 N.E.2d 1146 (1989).
The IELRB found that Abuzir
engaged in protected activity when he
received union assistance, that the
CBE knew about the assistance, and
that the CBE clearly took adverse
action against Abuzir when it
suspended him three times. However,
the IELRB held that none of the
suspensions were motivated by antiunion animus, because only the
timing of the suspensions were
suspect, and timing alone is not
sufficient to establish a prima facie
unfair labor practice case. Hardin
County Education Association v.
IELRB, 174 Ill. App. 3d. 168, 528
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N.E.2d 737 (4th Dist. 1988).
The IELRB also held that it would
not consider portions of Abuzir’s
unfair labor practice charge that were
not timely. Under section 15 of the
IELRA, the charging party has six
months from the date he becomes
aware or should have become aware of
the unfair labor practice to file a timely
charge. Jones v. IELRB, 272 Ill. App.
3d 612, 650 N.E.2d 1092 (1st Dist.
1995). Because parts of Abuzir’s
charge alleged adverse action outside
the six-month period, those parts were
not considered in the decision.
In Tropp v. Illinois State Board of
Education, Case. No. 2006-CA-0008-C
(IELRB, 2006), the IELRB held that
the Illinois State Board of Education
(ISBE) did not commit an unfair labor
practice under IELRA sections 14(a)(1)
and 14(a)(3) by terminating a special
education consultant engaged in
union activity, in part because the
ISBE successfully rebutted the
teacher’s disparate treatment claim.
Agnes Tropp, a special education
consultant for the ISBE, was suspended four times and then terminated for failing to produce quality
written work. After termination,
Tropp filed an unfair labor practice
charge, claiming she was fired for
filing grievances through her union
eight months earlier. The IELRB
Executive Director dismissed Tropp’s
unfair labor practice charge.
The IELRB affirmed the dismissal,
relying on Brown County Community
Unit School District No. 1, 2 PERI
1096 (IELRB 1986) which stated that
the Executive Director must determine: 1) whether the charging party
established a prima facie violation;
and 2) whether the respondent’s
evidence rebutted the charging party’s
claim. The Executive Director may
not, however, make any credibility
judgments of either side’s witnesses
when making this determination. Id.
The IELRB first held that Tropp
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had not established a prima facie case,
because she had not shown that her
termination was motivated by antiunion animus. Even if Tropp had
established a prima facie case, the
IELRB further held that the ISBE
successfully rebutted Tropp’s disparate treatment claim by showing that
two consultants not engaged in union
activity were terminated, and by
showing that other reprimanded
consultants who remained employed
were more effective than Tropp. Thus,
the ISBE did not give preferential
treatment to employees who were not
active in the union.
The IELRB also rejected Tropp’s
second claim that the Executive
Director’s investigation was inadequate because the Director did not
use his subpoena power and did not
recite all details of Tropp’s documents
in the Recommended Decision and
Order. Relying on Lincoln-Way Area
Special Education Joint Agreement
District 843, 21 PERI 163, (IELRB
2005) the IELRB explained that the
Executive Director has broad discretion in determining the scope of the
unfair labor practice charge investigation. Applying this rule, the IELRB
held that the Executive Director
properly conducted the investigation
by deciding which powers to invoke
and by distilling what was relevant
from Tropp’s documents.

IPLRA Developments
Deferral to Arbitration
In Alton Firefighters Association,
IAFF Local 1255 and City of Alton,
No. S-CA-05-010 (ILRB State Panel
2006), the State Panel affirmed the
decision and order of the executive
director, dismissing an unfair labor
practice charge against the City of
Alton and deferring to the awards
issued by the arbitrators.
In March 2004, the city of Alton
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terminated two employees. The Union
grieved and arbitrated both terminations. In addition, it filed an unfair
labor practice charge alleging that the
terminations violated the IPLRA.
Upon consideration by two separate
arbitrators, the City of Alton was
directed to reinstate each employee
with full back pay but was not ordered
to pay interest.The Executive Director
then dismissed the unfair labor charge
against the city and deferred to the
awards issued by the arbitrators.
In affirming the decision of the
Executive Director, the State Panel
followed the National Labor Relation
Board’s Spielberg standard. Spielberg
Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
Under the Spielberg standard, the
Board defers to an arbitration award
where: (1) the arbitrator had been
presented with and considered the
unfair labor practices at issue; (2) the
arbitration proceedings were regular
and fair; (3) the parties agreed to be
bound by the arbitration award; and
(4) the arbitration award is not
repugnant to the purposes of the Act.
The union argued that the Board
should not defer to the arbitration
award in this case because (1) neither
arbitrator considered the unfair labor
practice issue, partly because neither
arbitrator considered how the combined effect of the discharges demonstrated animus and (2) the arbitrators’
refusal to award interest on the
backpay was repugnant to the
purposes of the IPLRA. In response to
the union’s first argument, the Board
found that even if the arbitrators’
awards did not resolve the unfair labor
practice charges, the arbitrators’
decisions should be deferred to so long
as the charges were considered.
Because the transcripts from each
arbitration proceeding reflected that
the union raised the issues of the
unfair labor practices charges, the
Board found that both arbitrators did
in fact have the opportunity to consider
them. Regarding the union’s second
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argument, the Board held that
deferring to the arbitration awards in
this case would serve administrative
efficiency, and that administrative
efficiency is one of the important
purposes of the Act. Thus, the Board
found that deferral and dismissal were
not repugnant to the purposes Act.

First Amendment
Developments
Political Affiliation
In Allen v. Martin, 460 F.3d 939 (7th
Cir. 2006), the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit held that the
Illinois Department of Transportation
(IDOT) Bureau Chief of Accounting
and Auditing could be terminated for
political reasons without violating his
First Amendment rights. James Allen
was terminated from his position
several months after Rod Blagojevich
took office as governor of Illinois. The
defense conceded that Allen was
terminated for political affiliation.
Generally, the state may not
terminate an employee because of the
employee’s political affiliation. However, under Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S.
507 (1980), political loyalty may be
demanded as a requirement of the job
where the position involves making
policy and the exercise of political
judgment. The court evaluated Allen’s
position based on the position’s
established job description. It did so
because the job description was
written in 1985 and, thus, had not
been recently changed in an effort to
manipulate it for political purposes.
Additionally, the court observed, that
Allen’s own description of his duties
tracked those set forth in the job
description.
The court found that the Bureau
Chief of Accounting and Auditing had
broad discretion and authority. He
supervised four sections chiefs and a
secretary and, through them, ninety-
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five other employees. He was responsible for directing audits, establishing
procedures for fiscal control and
informing management of problems in
fiscal arrangements or expenditures.
The court observed that effective
performance of his functions was “of
great political value” and had “great
impact on the administration’s public
reputation.” Furthermore, the
Bureau Chief was responsible for
responding to inquiries from legislators concerning expenditures in their
districts. Consequently, the court
concluded that political loyalty was an
appropriate requirement for the job
and that Allen’s discharge based on
political affiliation did not violate his
right of free association.
The court also rejected Allen’s claim
that his discharge without a hearing
violated his Fourteenth Amendment
right to procedural due process. The
court observed that the Illinois
Personnel Code exempts IDOT’s
technical and engineering staff from
its coverage. Allen’s position was
classified as a technical position.
Consequently, the court held, Allen
lacked a property right in his
employment, and thus his discharge
did not amount to a deprivation of
property which would have required
due process.

FMLA Developments
Sovereign Immunity
In Toeller v. Wisconsin Department of
Corrections, 461 F.3d 871 (7th Cir.
2006), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit held that a state is
immune from suit for money damages
for violation of the Family Medical
Leave Act’s (FMLA’s) guarantee of
leave for an employee’s own serious
health condition, except possibly
where the health condition is related to
pregnancy. The FMLA guarantees
covered employees up to twelve weeks
of unpaid leave for the birth or
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adoption of a child; where needed to
care for a child, spouse or parent who
has a serious health condition; or for
the employee’s own serious health
condition. 29 U.S.C. § 2612. In Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003),
the Supreme Court held that Congress
validly abrogated the states’Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity to
suit for damages for violation of the
FMLA’s guarantee of leave to care for
a family member with a serious health
condition. However, in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), the
Court held that Congress did not
constitutionally abrogate states’ immunity to suits for violation of Title I
of the Americans with Disabilities
Act’s prohibition on discrimination in
employment on the basis of disability.
In Toeller, the court held that suits for
violation of the “self care” provision of
the FMLA are governed by Garrett
rather than Hibbs.
Toeller was fired by the Wisconsin
Department of Corrections three days
after he returned from an FMLAprotected leave for his own medical
condition. The purported reasons for
his discharge were threatening another employee, insubordination and
excessive absenteeism. Toeller sued
alleging that the reasons were pretexts
for a discharge that retaliated against
him for exercising his FMLA rights.
The Department moved to dismiss the
claim as barred by the state’s Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity.
The district court denied the motion
but the Seventh Circuit reversed.
The Seventh Circuit observed that
to abrogate a state’s immunity,
Congress must issue a clear statement
of its intent to abrogate and must have
the constitutional authority to abrogate. Relying on Hibbs, the court held
that Congress had issued such a clear
statement in the FMLA. The issue
thus turned on whether Congress had
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the constitutional authority to abrogate the state’s immunity.
The court focused on Congress’
authority under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court
observed that in Hibbs, the Supreme
Court relied on Congressional findings
of pervasive sex discrimination in the
administration of family leave programs by state governments. The
Hibbs Court thus upheld the FMLA’s
provisions governing family leave as
necessary to prevent sex discrimination and gender stereotyping. Classifications based on sex are subject to
heightened scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause.
On the other hand, the court
reasoned, with the possible exception
of medical conditions related to
pregnancy, Congress made no findings
and had no evidence of sex discriminations with respect to short term
personal medical needs that must be
addressed by absence from work.
Consequently, the court concluded,
the self care provision of the FMLA
was governed by Garrett rather than
Hibbs. In so holding, the court relied
on similar holdings in two other
circuits. Touvell v. Ohio Department
of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, 422 F.3d 392 (6th
Cir.2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 1339
(2006); Brockman v. Wyoming Department of Family Services, 342
F.3d 1159 (10th Cir. 2003).
X
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Further
References
(compiled by Yoo-Seong Song, Librar-

ian, Institute of Labor and Industrial
Relations Library, University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)
Hoobler, Jenny M. & Swanberg, Jennifer. THE ENEMY IS NOT US:
UNEXPECTED WORKPLACE
VIOLENCE TRENDS. PUBLIC
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT.
Vol. 35, no. 3. Fall 2006. pp. 229-246.
The authors contend that workplace
violence is the most serious security
threat to American workers, and they
examine the prevalence of workplace
violence in the public sector. Unfortunately, the authors claim that
ignorance about workplace violence
still exists among employees and
supervisors, and there have been very
little reports on the effects of “zero
tolerance” policies toward workplace
violence. They explore this issue by
studying the results of a survey from
900 employees of a Midwestern
municipal government on different
forms of workplace violence. They
conclude that public service organizations need to pay closer attention to the
“disturbing frequency of experiencing
and observing violent episodes.” While
employees are well aware of potential
consequences of such episodes, HR
policies do not adequately address this
issue.
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Mitchell, Daniel J. “THEY WANT
TO DESTROY ME”: HOW
CALIFORNIA’S FISCAL CRISIS
BECAME A WAR ON “BIG
GOVERNMENT UNIONS,”
WORKING USA: THE JOURNAL OF LABOR AND SOCIETY.
Vol. 9, no. 1. March 2006. pp. 99121.
The author illustrates how Governor
Arnold Schwarzenegger of California
sought to resolve the state’s budget
crisis and how his initiatives eventually became a battle against “big
government unions.” Union membership in California has traditionally
been higher compared to other states,
and over a half of California union
members are in the public sector.When
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger
attempted to solve the state’s budget
crisis by directly going to the state
election, his action consequently
resulted in unifying union members in
private and public employment, who
had not necessarily maintained a
unified voice in the past. The author
suggests possible causes of his
unsuccessful initiatives which only
antagonized state union workers.

(Books and articles anotated in
Further References are available on
interlibary loan through ILLINET by
contacting your local public library or
system headquarters.)
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